Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 27
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
International Telecommunications Law in the PostDeregulatory Landscape

Article 19

2002

Keynote Address
Reed Hundt

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Reed Hundt, Keynote Address, 27 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol27/iss3/19

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

4/10/02 4:25:56 PM

KEYNOTE ADDRESS TRANSCRIPT
REED E. HUNDT*
REED HUNDT: Thank you all for inviting me. This is a return engagement, which I never have. But I know so much
about my classmate Dean Joan Wexler that if there is anyone
here who would like an office assignment or something like
that, I can help. But I do honor what she’s doing here, and I’m
sorry I haven’t been able to visit with her.
This is the most grandiose title that I was able to think of:
“The Rule of Telecom Law in the 21st Century.” I was thinking
of saying “in the next millennium,” but I think the century will
do. So I thought this would take about twenty minutes to
cover.
Your Professor Paul Schwartz is the best reviewer of my
book, the only really good reviewer, that I had with this book
that had a very tiny circulation. Sales have been flagging. So I
thought that I would take plenty of time to pay attention to my
book here.
It ought to be assigned, everywhere in the world. I just got an
e-mail from my publisher who asked if I would agree that it
could be translated into Japanese for $100 due to the strength
of the dollar vis-à-vis the yen. But that’s okay, I said yes. And
then I got an e-mail from the translator in Japan. The Internet
is really great, but I’m a little worried about the way this book
is going to come across. The translator e-mailed the following:
“What exactly is the Federal Communications Commission? Is
it a business and can you buy its stock?” The answer is, in a
manner of speaking — that is the story of the book. Anyhow,
we’re not going to re-translate the Japanese back to the English, if any of you do want to assign this book in its original beginnings, you can still get copies from the remainderman.

* Senior Advisor, McKinsey & Co., Inc.; Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission (1993-1997). Mr. Hundt is the author of the recently released
book You Say You Want a Revolution: A Story of Information Age Politics
(2000).
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I left the FCC at the end of 1997 and like Rip Van Winkle, I
just went to sleep, and I woke up here today, and the NASDAQ
is up and the Dow is up and there doesn’t seem to be anything
to worry about. And yet everyone is overcome by misery with
respect to both of these indices. In the beginning of the year
2000, the telecom sector of the American economy began to
drop. It actually played a very big role in dragging down the
S&P 500, just as the information sector and telecom in particular within that sector pushed it up in the previous two years.
There’s nothing about this story that has made anyone
happy. I’ve been on the boards of five companies that have
gone bankrupt or closed their doors in this time period. They
were all start-ups, they all had very interesting ideas, and they
all ran out of money. As mentioned, I am fortunate to be on the
board of Intel, which during the worst year for semi -conductors
in history, made $1 billion in profit. If you’re very, very big and
you have tremendous scale, you can cope. But if you’re not so
big and you haven’t achieved economies of scale, you can’t cope.
This is a very simple thing to say that has the merit of being
true about the telecom sector: many of the companies that have
collapsed had never gotten to the economies of scale necessary
to run their businesses.
Here is an obituary list for the sector. There are twenty-two
companies on it. I knew most of the CEO’s of these companies.
They raised in debt and equity totaling $95 billion — that’s
actual dollars received in the company — and in these cases
they spent all that money. At the peak of the market, these
companies collectively had a $260 billion market cap. That
means that they were worth almost as much as the incumbent
former monopolists in telecom. Not quite as much, but in the
same order of magnitude.
The view was that the attackers were going to be able to
build the networks with very, very low costs, much lower than
the incumbents; they were going to be able to take market
share hand -over-fist; they were the new wave of innovators and
they were going to replace the old — and now all the money’s
gone. Some other things have happened in this time period.
Some people made money. In the time period from the beginning of the 1990’s to the beginning of this decade, American
households sold on a net basis, $1 trillion of stock. That’s a lot
of cashing out by American households, and that is one of the
reasons why the consumer sector has fought so valiantly
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against the downturn and why our recession on a macro basis
hasn’t been that significant. All that cash has created a tremendous reservoir of consumer spending which you’re continuing to see be tapped.
Now, of course, the paper wealth in these households has
greatly declined. You heard Alan Greenspan making that
point, worrying about the negative wealth effect, this week.
The question raised is whether our regulatory policies in the
United States, which we have fought for on the global level all
through the 1990’s, were wrong. Have they led to this boom
and this bust? Did they precipitate the bubble? Were we at
the FCC really the [Dutch] Tulip Commission? That is the
question that is presented. I don’t think that it does any good
to pretend the question is not bouncing around.
Yesterday I got back from Poland, where I was trying to sell
my book the previous three days. It hasn’t been translated into
Polish yet either, and based on my remarks I don’t think it’s
going to be. The big question in Poland was this: Were they,
because they didn’t adopt these reforms, lucky? Have they had
their scalp creased by a bullet? Are they warned now that they
should retain regulations that promote the Polish telephone
monopoly? Was that really the lesson to be learned from all
this history?
This discussion in Poland led to still another discussion,
which is the most important discussion in Poland and many of
the Eastern European countries. What do they do about the
fact that they have, plus or minus a few points, about 20% unemployment? If you graduate from school today in one of the
former communist bloc countries, your odds of getting a decent
job are maybe 50/50. There are no jobs in the manufacturing
sector for these folks. Poland either becomes a service economy
fairly quickly, or in the long run they won’t have a competitive
economy at all. [Charts presented].
So this chart is about fundamental demand. What this chart
says is that consumers have paid more money and devoted a
greater percent of their wallets, to communications services
steadily through the 1990’s.
And what have they bought? They’ve bought things that
didn’t previously exist to be bought. They’ve bought a widespread variety of wireless services, narrowband Internet access
that you dial up to, at around fifty kilobytes a second. They’ve
bought broadband, one and a half megabits a second. They
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bought vertical services, the batch of extra line items on your
bill that in fact practically doubles the average telephone bill in
the United States. People are paying more for more. That’s
why this is a growth sector. That’s why we’re a successful service economy.
This underlying demand is continuing at a staggering rate.
Cable TV is an industry that was built under the United States
decision that it would be lawful to have monopolies — to
achieve economies of scale. But the cable growth is essentially
correlated to the GDP, which is not bad, but not eye -popping.
However, when you look at the new services driven by the
Internet, and the use of the existing networks through the new
technologies that are associated with the Internet, the growth
rates are prodigious. After the Twin Towers were attacked,
you may have read, there were 1.2 billion instant messages
sent within the AOL community alone that very day. Five or
six per person in the United States. IM is a service that didn’t
exist a handful of years previously.
In the thirty-eight years after the telephone began to be deployed in the 1890’s, 10% penetration was achieved. Cable TV
took thirty years for 10% penetration under the monopoly paradigm. By contrast, narrowband is the fastest growing communications service in history. In two years, 10% of the United
States had adopted the Internet.
There’s one fundamental reason. The regulatory policy of the
United States was to create the lowest input costs for Internet
service providers of any country in the world by a factor of ten
to 100. Let’s say that same thing another way, because it’s so
incredibly important. We consciously decided in the United
States to have Internet service providers be able to borrow the
existing networks at very, very, very low costs. By regulation,
we obliged the proprietors of those networks — the telephone
companies for the most part — to sell on a wholesale basis the
use of their network to Internet service providers at a very low
incremental cost.
The result was that almost overnight 5000 Internet service
providers sprung into being in the United States. One of them
was called AOL. There was a tremendous winnowing process
that went on here. But by and large, this huge industry, growing like Kudzu vines, shrinking like Darwin might have imagined, created massive penetration. In the exact same time pe-
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riod, the regulators in Asia, particularly Japan, made the exact
opposite decisions and produced the opposite results.
It cost 100 times more in Japan to be an Internet service
provider, in the early years of the Net, than it did the United
States. And ten times more in Europe. That’s the reason why
in Japan, Internet household penetration, as of six months ago
I think, was under 10%. It’s about 56% in the United States.
First, if you’ve read about NTT Docomo, the wireless company,
sending all these different messages, remember it’s nine kilobytes a seconds. That’s one -sixth of what narrowband access is
in the United States. And second, it is popular because you
don’t get the Internet in many places except through that technology in Japan. The reason is that the parent company, the
existing telephone company, charges so much to ISPs that
comparatively few thrive.
In the U.S. we purposely created a new mass medium called
the Internet. That’s the reason the Internet is in English. It
didn’t start out that everybody said this Net is going to be in
English. That is what I started out with in my book, if I haven’t mentioned my book lately.
Broadband is the second fastest growing communications
service in history. The United States has more broadband users, the last time I looked, than in all the other developed countries added together. Our percentage is lower than South Korea, which has adopted the American narrowband policies to
broadband, meaning they built the facilities and obliged that
they be made available at almost no cost to any broadband provider. They lowered the input cost and created a competitive
market so that the output at the retail level is very, very low,
and they have 45% household penetration for broadband as a
result of that.
Do regulatory policies matter? They are one of the top two
most important considerations, the other being the capital
markets. And that’s always been true. This is what we’ve
learned in the last few years. We’ve learned that when you
talk about communications services you should talk about four
different demographic groups: big businesses, small businesses,
mobile or wireless users, and then household residents. What
we’ve learned is that each of these “buckets” actually calls for a
different set of services. There’s intense competition for some
of these services in some of these areas, and in other areas
there isn’t.
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So we’ve gotten smarter about understanding the business.
The corollary is that there ought to be a different regulatory
policy for each of these groups, which we did not recognize as a
country a few years ago, and that isn’t the way the law is written. When you talk about the future you need to look into the
world of opportunity. What we’ve learned is that our legal and
regulatory policies ought to be shaped around the future, not
about the past. We ought not to have this spate of regulation
and judicial decisions that reflect and help cause stock market
decline. We ought to have decisions about what is the right
paradigm to approach all of the stuff that hasn’t yet been done.
About 70% of households in Europe lack Internet access –
45% in the U.S. And 56% of U.S. consumers don’t have a cell
phone yet. These are the services that have yet to be sold. If
you do a demographic analysis, you see that unless there are
ways for the services to be priced at lower levels, or to have
more value per dollar, we’re not going to increase penetration.
There’s no question that the Internet is going to shape the future. I just want to point this out. What wireless LAN and
free high-speed data means is that in about three years every
PC is going to have embedded in it — at a cost of about a penny
to you the consumer — a chip that is going to mean that if we
ever go in a room where someone has installed (talk about bad
branding) an “802.11 hub site,” then you are automatically going to be on the Internet.
This is what it means. Within three years everybody walking around with a PC, every time they go to Starbucks, they’re
going to be automatically on the Internet. They probably aren’t
going to be paying for it. It’ll probably be in the price of the cup
of coffee. That means that the mobile telephone industry that
you know today isn’t going to be the mobile telephone industry
of three years from now. They’re either going to adapt to this
change or not. But if we’re talking about regulation and law,
what should they do in Poland, what should we do differently
here, then the number one thing that I’ve learned in the last
several years is this: You have to have a vision about where
technology is going and you have to have a point of view about
whether you want regulation, to try to stop it (a hopeless effort), or try to embrace it in some way, in a manner consistent
with the national interest.
For example, maybe the right thing to do is to have innovative, constructive technologies not just for the sake of change —
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although, maybe that is a sufficient reason — but for the different reason which is they’re more efficient, they produce more
services at a lower price, they produce higher productivity
gains and they create a wealthier economy. If you don’t have a
wealthier economy, you can’t talk about education and health
care, social security, and military defense.
So in Poland, they’re talking about the telephone company,
and I was very struck by the following that one of my McKinsey
colleagues shared with these folks: China was so committed to
catching up in the 1990’s, that they built one Bell-telephone company-size phone network every year for the decade. Every
single year. And now they have millions of telephone lines that
they believe are stranded assets, that no one is ever going to
use efficiently. They built yesterday’s technology. They didn’t
build to what, in fact, is the overtaking technology, which is
wireless phones, and they absolutely did not build an Internet
network.
So this is what happens when the state decides either to close
a particular monopoly or establish regulatory protection; or
alternatively just to make the investment decisions itself.
That’s a staggering amount of money perhaps wasted in a relatively poor economy like China’s. Is this one of the reasons why
China Telecom hasn’t yet gone public? Perhaps they can’t figure out how to describe themselves to inve stors in some way
that makes them look like they have the right business model.
Of course efficiency is a terrible thing because look at what
can happen. Over sixteen years, long distance prices dropped
gradually due to the introduction of a modest amount of competition by regulators. But on the private version of the Internet,
where there’s never been any price regulation of long haul data
transmission, the drop in price was huge over a short period of
time. So when you read about a Global Crossing going bankrupt, behind that there is a price drop of 90% in five months.
If you’re a trader of bandwidth, like somebody in Houston,
you’d say, “Well, if I could figure out how to trade this and
catch those peaks, I could make a lot of money as a trader.”
But what if you’re actually in the business of building one of
these networks? In February you decide to spend $100, on the
assumption that you’re going to get your money back over time,
and you find out by May that you’ve got to cut your revenue
line by 92%. We had fourteen long haul data networks built in
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the United States in a few years. We will end up probably with
two, maybe three that will survive bankruptcy.
Our government can make its contribution to the uncertainties of business and to the fundamental problems of change
that technology drives. [Chart presented]. This is a chart that
shows the biggest single mistake ever made by any government
in the history of communications regulation. This is a chart
that shows the e ffect of the auctions of 3G Spectrum in Europe.
This is a cash flow chart. This is break even up here. They
started off by selling off by auction licenses at such a high price
and transferred so much cash so quickly in the auction sale,
that if you look at what it will cost to build the system and
where you will have to get in terms of cash flow to have operational break even, the bottom line is that these systems can’t
make money. The go vernments sold the spectrum at such a
high price that they immediately put out of business any 3G
industry in Europe. They happened to sell it to their national
carriers, who are fixed wire based companies, and that’s why
all of them are now struggling to keep away from bankruptcy.
That’s a heck of thing for a government to do, just in one decision, to be able to cripple an entire industry across a continent. At the FCC, it took many decisions for us to do that
much harm, even according to our critics. You cannot have a
policy unless business is willing to spend money to make the
policy go. Investment is gas in the tank. For those who are
business historians or legal historians, telecom is going to feel
like anything that you’ve ever read or learned about railroads
in the United States in the 1870’s, 1880’s time period.
So now we’ll talk about “the sunny side of the street.” This is
supposed to be in the future — this is the theory of the future,
the theory advanced by the tech community — it is not a theory
that to my knowledge is embraced anywhere in government at
the present time. We have a government right now in Washington that for ideological reasons doesn’t wish to be involved
in the thought partnership with technology that existed
through the 1990’s. Argentina and telecom both are too far
South for this Administration to pay attention to.
They may be right. They may be wrong. But the cool theory
is that more megabytes a second; faster, more efficient networks — specifically IP networks — will lead to the greater
use, measured by message instructions per second, reflecting
the power of your computer chip, which in turn will produce
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new services. This means you will be able to do things with
your computer that right now you don’t do. You can download
movies, you can make movies.
Some people here have read Larry Lessig’s new book, The
Future of Ideas. The beginning of that book, the McGuffin that
gets the whole plot going, is a discussion about how everybody
ought to be able to make their own movies with their computer.
One of the reasons that they can’t is because they don’t have
enough megabytes per second of bandwidth to challenge the
PC’s computing power. The new services then would be driven
by this increase in the MBPS, and you would have a good virtuous cycle. Instead of the vectors being negative, they would
all be positive, and the economy would be growing again. I’m
going to briefly summarize the confession part — as to the mistakes that were made in the United States, in large part by me.
But if you could just not pass this information on, I would be
grateful.
In the residential market, there was no chance of having real
competition in the fixed wire residential market without rebalancing — meaning without deregulating prices and allowing
telephone companies to charge some price above cost. We
didn’t do that. We didn’t have any rebalancing. It wasn’t in the
1996 Telecommunications Act. The power to set these retail
prices is with the states. The states have taken the FCC to the
Supreme Court repeatedly over the jurisdictional question of
whether the FCC could preempt the states on this. The states
have fought every jurisdictional issue since the telephone was
invented. And typically they’ve won because our Court, particularly in the last couple of decades, has been quite sensitive
to the claim of states on jurisdictional issues. One of the results is a lack of adequate power to have a national paradigm.
Therefore, there is not enough competition in the residential
market of fixed wire.
But there’s wireless. That’s intermodal competition. The
FCC did create a competitive market in wireless, with many,
many carriers. It’s the most competitive market in the world,
and competition caused the price of wireless to drop very, very
radically so that it began to substitute for wire. This was our
way to pull the rug out from under those states that were trying to restrict, through their pricing mechanisms, competition
in the residential market. And this technique will work in the
fullness of time.
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In the small to medium size enterprise market, unbundled
elements work. If you allow . . . a new entrant to borrow the
existing company’s network, the retail prices are high enough
so that the new entrant can afford to compete. But Darwin
rules. This is a case of survival of the fittest. There were 300
competitive local telephone companies started in the wake of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act. There was never any rational chance for more than about four or five big ones to survive.
Actually, I knew that. Nobody asked me, but I did know
that. The reason I knew that is that a bunch of economists told
me, and nobody was more surprised than those of us at the
FCC to see the private equity community fund 300 CLECs.
None of us to this day have been able to figure out what we
could have done about it. But one idea is perhaps, contrary to
any notion of free market behavior — we should have licensed
the number of competitive companies so as to stop private investors from losing their minds and their money.
The problem now is that there’s definitely a possibility that
baby and bath water will be thrown out at the same time.
Henry Ford was one of about 200 people who were inventing
automobiles at the turn of the century, and it was his second
company (the first went bankrupt) that became Ford Motor
Company. This is an extremely common pattern of innovation.
There were, I think, 1000 companies in the late 19th century
that sold sweet, dark colored syrupy drinks, and one became
Coca-Cola and the others eventually did not exist. Whether
we’re willing to have this Darwinian struggle work its way out
in telecom depends on whether the investors in Manhattan are
treated in a way that investors have historically been treated,
or whether this sector is exempt by government from the harsh
downside of competition.
Among large businesses, the buyers get the best prices in
America that they get in any country in the world. It may surprise you to know that in the large business data market,
AT&T and WorldCom collectively have about 80% market
share. They’ve held it through thick and thin, because it’s so
difficult to service large businesses and because there is buying
power.
Among global users, we have the best story in the world.
When you free these markets to competition, you discover unmet demand, and it’s a fantastic story. The nicest thing that I
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learned in Poland is that, with competition, in five years
they’ve completely eliminated the waiting lists for telephones,
which used to be between five and ten years long. That’s true
on a global basis. In Brazil there’s no longer a waiting list. It
used to be one to two years. In none of the former communist
bloc countries is there a significant waiting list. It used to be
that you had to be the son of a high-ranking party official to get
a telephone. And all that is gone. The unmet demand is being
met, and new demand is being discovered.
Efficient universal service works, we’ve learned this in the
last few years. What this means is that if you give the subsidy
money to the buyer, and let the buyer do the shopping, you get
a really great system.
Here’s an example. The 1996 Telecommunications Act said
we needed to have the Internet in every classroom in the
United States. The previous paradigm was to tell the service
provider — the telephone company — to put this in the classroom. Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, by contrast,
the paradigm was give the money to the school district on a
matching grant basis, and then let the school district shop for
the Internet. Ninety percent of the school districts in the
United States found money for the matching grant within two
years, and we went from 9% penetration in classrooms — not
just in the buildings, but in classrooms — to 84% penetration,
in four years. It’s the most successful universal service story in
any kind of state-mandated activity that I can think of.
And last but not least, we learned that everything is about
market structure. In wireless, we’ve had a competitive market
structure and produced great results. The market of long haul
data was divided among fourteen carriers. There was no way
that government could save many of those people from going
under, and that’s what’s happened. In the local exchange and
the cable market, the economies of scale and the network effects are so vast that it is very hard for regulators to create
competition among rival identical networks.
We’ve also learned that ideas matter. So I’m just going to
talk about the top one: Metcalf’s Law. It is that the value of a
network increases exponentially according to the number of
users — meaning, if one more person joins a network, the value
of that network increases for everyone on the ne twork. Or to
put it more simply, if Paul and I can talk to each other, that’s
great, but then we add Susan. So if I can call her and he can

4/10/02 4:25:56 PM

966

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. XXVII:3

call her and she can call us, we’ve suddenly got many more
lines of potential calling available. The value of the network is
greater for me, it is greater for him, it is greater for her . . . it
has gone up exponentially. So what this tells you is the bigger
the network, the more people it reaches, the more valuable the
network is. That is the fundamental economic reason why the
Internet has created so much value in the United States: because it increases value for all users. This notion that communities increase in value as they grow larger is the fundamental
idea behind the way the Internet works. If it means anything,
it must mean this: we really do want the Internet to be a mass
medium.
How to achieve goals is the primary question for a regulator.
It’s almost certainly the case that we need to set, as a country,
the goal of deregulating all retail prices. The idea of telecom
was that one company would be regulated, originally voluntarily, to provide a “vanilla quality” product at a price that everybody would subscribe to. We need to recognize that if you’re
going to embrace competition, you need to have the other side
of it, which is to be indifferent as a country to the regulation of
retail prices.
We don’t regulate the price of any of the necessities of life.
You don’t regulate the retail price of butter, DVDs, bread or
wine, any of the necessities. So why are we regulating the
price of telecom services?
There are at least two telecom services where we do not regulate the retail price. One is wireless and the other is the Internet. I can’t see that any harm has come from either of those
acts of deregulation. But we might never be able to deregulate
the price at which a small company can connect to a big company’s network. That’s why phones may always have to be
regulated; otherwise the network effects for the big company
might mean that absent inter connection, any market would
collapse into monopoly.
The other thing to decide is: are we going to be so eager to get
economies of scale that we sacrifice diversity. The broadcast
industry was regulated to guarantee diversity really until the
administration of the present chairman, who has said he has
less interest in doing this. And yet I think we have to recognize
that during the period of the most intense regulation, there
was really one kind of audience, one notion of the ideal American. And you look today at the content of TV and you say
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there’s just no question whatsoever that it is so much more
eclectic, even in networks, than it has ever been before. But I
think you have to ask the question: What is really the truth
about diversity? Is it pluralism or multiple ownership? Which
goals are those we’re really trying for? Ownership diversity?
Are we trying to have women and minorities own the stations?
Lessig and others of that group would tell you that the main
goal is to have a platform diversity, to make sure that none of
these emerging broadband networks can design software systems that can preclude other people from inter-operating or
interacting.
I think we have to recognize that on TV, the news has moved
to the right, and entertainment has gone to the left. The news
is much more conservative now than ever before. The entertainment is far more liberal, in a very general sense of the
term. You can get what I would call a liberal point of view all
over the entertainment media, to an astonishing degree. Look
at shows like “West Wing.” But that’s far less true of mainstream media journal ism. That’s my view. But is it important
that the go vernment be concerned with this particular topic?
This is probably the most important of all these topics for a
functioning democracy. It’s the one that no one in government
cares to talk about but everybody always cares about. I’m going to leave this one as just a huge question, and I’m going to
move directly to the international piece.
There isn’t any doubt that globalization is a more dramatic
phenomenon with respect to the technology information sector
than it is with respect to any other sector of the economy. I
think I can say that without fear of challenge. There are other
sectors that are massively globalized, such as financial. But
the “financial services world trade organization treaty” doesn’t
exist, whereas there is a telecom and information technology
world trade organization.
There is only one sector where as a matter of treaty on a
global basis all nations are obliged to have a regulatory agency
that follows the exact same four point precept for creating competition and providing a rule of law, and that’s the communications sector. It’s the only global treaty in which there is an independent agency that must be created in each of the sixtynine signatory countries. And I was just in Poland talking to
the first and second chairmen of their “FCC.” Anywhere in the
world that you go now you can find somebody who’s the first or
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second person to have ever held that regulatory job in their
country. As we speak, they are trying to find lawyers, trying to
figure out what ought to be in their codes and what ought to be
their paradigms. And they’re all vastly more similar than different.
This is the only industry on a global basis where this common rule of law is developing in this way; so the following
questions have to be answered, because everybody around the
world is asking for the answers: Is there some fundamental
right to know with respect to content that ought to be embedded in the regulatory schemes of every country? We have, for
example, in the United States, a number of notions kicking
around in the administration to the effect that information
should be precluded from the Web. Various government age ncies are being ordered, as we speak, to take information off the
Web or not to provide it on the grounds of security concerns.
What’s the right paradigm? We don’t actually have an answer
to that question, and we’ve got a lot of reasons to debate it seriously on all sides. But this is a question that exists in every
country in the world, and we need answers.
The world of capital similarly wants to know the rules of
competition, and we absolutely need this . . . we need to have
some notion of how we’re going to enforce on a global basis this
particular treaty. And this is a huge field of conversation
where there are no answers provided yet.
When everybody was talking about the Internet, they said:
All of the people who get on the Internet here — and it’s 8% of
their population — are going to the United States for their information. They’re all getting on the Internet and traveling to
the U.S. They said 30% of all the international communication
in and out of Poland is this 8% of people reading the Web in
English in the United States. We don’t like it. We think that
there ought to be a Polish Internet country, just like there’s a
real physical Poland. What should we do? Should we charge
different prices so it’s too expensive for people to travel over the
Internet to the United States? Raise the price, limit the
amount? Should we have the government translate Yahoo into
Polish? Should we just cut the Internet off? Should we supervise the websites? They’re asking in effect: What’s purely national here about communications? Is it the case that there
isn’t a national boundary?
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The conference ended, and I was going to the airport. As I
was driving by a wall along the road, I saw the answer. Somebody had spray-painted on the wall, “No bo rders, no nations.”
And I thought, “well, you know, this is great,” because that actually is the answer. Now, I didn’t say that’s the answer as a
matter of law. That is inevitably the answer as a matter of
technology. It’s not possible to look at the power of this technology and say that it has borders and that it respects nations.
It is also the case that any particular country can adopt a national paradigm that limits the efficiency, reduces the efficiency, limits the reach, shrinks the audience, creates less than
a mass market, for these new technologies. But they can’t alter
the fact that the technology is a road. There can be barriers,
and countries certainly can so slow the rate of change that they
will make their country poorer or make their people more discontented, and many are choosing that particular path as we
speak. The price of the Internet in Poland is 100 times higher
than it is in the United States as we speak. There’s a reason
why it’s just 8% online.
But is that really the right choice? It’s immensely important
at this conference and others like it. We continue to take the
lead here in the U.S., and join with anybody anywhere else in
the world and try to advance the ball, because at the other end
of this story, in spite of the rainy weather in the market, it’s
absolutely the case there are pots of gold from a social perspective, from a wealth creation perspective, and it’s up to us to
find where the rainbow ends. Thank you very much.

